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This paper is concerned with the labor market experience of Swedish youths during the
1980s and the 1990s. The first objective is to portray early economic attainment among
young Swedes. The second objective of the paper is to examine the impact of labor market
programs on youth employment. We find that the slump in the 1990s has been associated
with dramatic increases in youth unemployment and youth participation in active labor
market programs. The impact on unemployment rates by age and education has been
roughly proportional, however. The evolution of employment and unemployment does not
offer much ground for the popular hypothesis that the recent rise in unemployment is
driven by large and pervasive shifts in the demand for labor by skill attributable to
technological innovation. The employment crisis has been met by an unprecedented
increase in active labor market programs, in large part targeted at unemployed youths.
There is a risk that these programs may crowd out regular youth employment, a
hypothesis that is supported in our empirical investigation of regular youth employment in
Swedish municipalities.
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￿￿￿,QWURGXFWLRQ
The Swedish labor market experienced a dramatic change in the early 1990s. The overall
unemployment rate was 1.5 percent in 1989 and 1.6 percent in 1990. By 1993, the
unemployment rate had increased to 8.2 percent. Since then unemployment has remained at a
high level (8.1 percent in 1996). The slump induced a sharp expansion of various labor market
programs; the number of people in programs increased from 1 percent of the labor force in
1990 to 5 percent in 1994. Most of the program participants are classified as being out of the
labor force, so a mirror image of these developments was a substantial fall in labor force
participation ratios (from 87 to 80 percent for males and 82 to 76 percent for females). The
employment-to-population ratio fell by over 10 percentage points during the same period, from
83.1 percent in 1990 to 72.6 percent in 1993 and 71.6 percent in 1996.
The sources of the steep fall in employment have been discussed elsewhere, and we do not
attempt to summarize or contribute to this debate here. Suffice it to say that macroeconomic
shocks played an important part, partly driven by external forces (such as higher real interest
rates) and partly by internal policy failures. In addition to the  macroeconomic shocks that hit
the economy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, there are a number of plausible supply side
factors, such as an increasingly more generous unemployment insurance system, that may have
caused some trend rise in the equilibrium unemployment rate over the past three decades.
It is well known that the burden of unemployment is not shared equally among people; the
young and the less skilled are particularly prone to unemployment. The present paper is
concerned with the labor market experience of Swedish youths during the 1980s and the
1990s. The first objective is to portray early economic attainment among young Swedes. We
make use of two data sets with information on labor market outcomes and education among2
school leavers. Are parental resources and early educational choices crucial for the school
leavers’ success in the labor market and in the education system? Are there distinct differences
between the patterns prevailing in the years of boom in the late 1980s and the years of slump in
the 1990s? Has the slump been particularly costly for disadvantaged youths? 1
The second objective of the paper is to examine the impact of labor market programs on youth
employment. The sharp deterioration of the labor market situation in the 1990s has been met
by an unprecedented increase in various active labor market programs, such as educational
programs and measures to put people into work (or work-like activities). Several programs
have been explicitly targeted at unemployed youths. What is the impact of these programs on
regular youth employment? We use panel data on employment by Swedish municipalities to
examine to what extent the programs crowd out regular employment.
￿￿￿<RXWK￿(PSOR\PHQW￿DQG￿8QHPSOR\PHQW￿LQ￿6ZHGHQ
Youth relative wages increased substantially in Sweden between the late 1960s and the mid-
1980s, along with a sharp decline in overall wage differentials. The ratio between hourly wages
of 18-19-year-olds and wages of 35-44-year-olds stood at 0.55 in 1968 and had increased to
0.80 in 1986. After 1986 there has been a modest drop in the relative wages among teenagers.
Relative wages among 20-25-year olds have been much more stable around 80 percent, with a
minor increase between 1968 and 1974. The causes of pay compression in Sweden have been
explored elsewhere. In our view, they have to be found in fundamental demand and supply
forces as well as egalitarian wage policies pursued by the strong trade unions. (See  Edin and
Holmlund, 1995, for further details and discussion.)
                                                        
1 For discussions the youth labor market before the downturn in the 1990s, see e.g. Schröder (1995),
Blomskog (1997), and Blomskog and Schröder (1997).3
To the extent that the rise in youth relative wages has been institutionally driven one would
expect adverse employment responses. To what extent, then, are there signs of deteriorating
labor market outcomes for Swedish youths? Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the period of
marked pay compression in Sweden from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s does not seem have
been accompanied by substantially increasing inequality in employment outcomes.
There is evidence of some trend deterioration in youth labor market performance, however.
From the mid-1960 and to the early 1980s there is trend increase in youth unemployment rates
and also a trend increase in youth relative to adult unemployment. Youth participation in labor
market programs increased substantially in the mid-1980s. For example, over 10 percent of the
16-19-year-old population were engaged in public employment programs in 1984. Program
activity declined however rapidly during the strong labor market improvement of the late
1980s.
A comparison between the structure of employment and unemployment in 1970 and 1990 is
sufficient to capture the main trends over the 1970s and the 1980s; these two years are
characterized by a very tight labor market with very low unemployment (1.4 percent in 1970
and 1.6 percent in 1990). The unemployment rate among 18-24-year-olds increased from 2.5
to 3.5 percent between 1970 and 1990 (Table 1). There was a substantial increase in the youth
employment-to-population rate, primarily driven by rising labor force participation among
young women. School enrollment among teenagers increased as the senior high school was
extended. Rising school enrollment has made teenage labor force participants an increasingly
selected group with relatively low educational attainment, which contributes to relatively high
unemployment.4











1970 2.5 66.9 38.4 12.8 N.A.
1990 3.5 75.1 46.4 11.1 2.1
1993 19.1 49.5 63.2 18.9 10.4
1995 18.9 49.1 65.0 21.7 7.4
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: *   Percent of labor force.
** Percent of population.
Sources: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden and Thoursie (1996).
Youth unemployment skyrocketed as the slump hit the Swedish economy in the early 1990s.
Overall unemployment increased from 1.6 percent to 8.2 percent between 1990 and 1993 and
has remained stubbornly high. Unemployment among 18-24-olds increased from 3.5 percent to
19.1 percent during the same three-year period. The overall employment-to-population ratio
declined by 10 percentage points, whereas the youth employment rate declined by no less than
25 percentage points. There has also been a substantial increase in school enrollment, including
activities organized as active labor market policies. We will return to a discussion of these
policies in Section 4. Suffice here to note that they were traditionally not particularly targeted
at unemployed youths, but this changed already in the mid-1980s. By 1993, 10 percent of the
18-24-year-olds were enrolled in various labor market programs.
Another group that was hit very hard by the slump in the downturn in the Swedish economy in
the 1990s was immigrants. Unemployment rates among recent immigrants (foreign citizens) are
much higher than among Swedish citizens. Whereas average unemployment among 20-24-5
year-olds increased from 3 percent to 17 percent between 1990 and 1994, unemployment
among foreign citizens in this age group rose from 6 to 30 percent. Unemployment among
recent immigrants aged 35-44 was as high as 20 percent in 1994.
The depression that hit the Swedish economy in the early 1990s has affected all age groups and
all education groups. Unemployment among 16-24 year olds increased by a factor of 5 whereas
unemployment among 35-44 year olds increased by a factor of 6. The ratio between youth (16-
24) and adult (35-44) unemployment was 3.7 in 1990 and 2.9 in 1993. The ratio between low-
education unemployment (compulsory schooling) and university unemployment stood at 2.5
percent in 1990 and at 2.4 percent in 1993. Indeed, there is considerable evidence from a
number of countries that unemployment  relativities for age and education groups are fairly
stable over the business cycle. (See Nickell and Bell, 1995, for evidence and interpretations.)
￿￿￿/DERU￿0DUNHW￿2XWFRPHV￿LQ￿WKH￿￿￿￿￿V￿DQG￿WKH￿￿￿￿￿V
3.1 Labor market status among disadvantaged youths
To provide a somewhat more detailed background for our discussion of disadvantaged youth
in the 1980s and 1990s, we start by describing the main trends in employment and non-
employment for various age-education groups since 1971. We choose to concentrate on males
to abstract from the massive increase in female labor force participation during the period in
question.
Since 1971 there have been a number of major changes that may have affected the youth labor
market. The combination of (i) an increasingly selected group that do not stay on at school, (ii)
adverse labor demand shifts, and (iii) pay compression could potentially have created a large
increase in joblessness among disadvantaged youth. Some evidence on this issue is presented in6
Figure 1, where we graph the employment-to-population rate for males of different ages (16-
19, 20-24, and 35-44) with different levels of schooling (no high school, 1-2 years of high
school, and 3-4 years of high school).2
There are two striking features of these graphs. The first is the dramatic development of the
1990s; the second is the absence of strong long-run trends in employment. The only trend in
the data is for teenagers (with no high school). Employment rates fall rather steadily for this
group with the exception for the boom in the late 1980s. The reason for this trend seems to be
the increased school enrollment of teenagers with no previous high school education (see Table
1 above). Apart from this it seems difficult to discern any sizable long-run trends in these data.
Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1995) contains a more detailed analysis of these data in terms
of employment and non-employment for different parts of the
                                                        
2The corresponding graphs for unemployment-to-population rates and non-participation rates are
reported in the Appendix.7
Figure 1 Employment-to-population ratios for males with no high school, short high



























































































































































































skill distribution and they come to similar conclusions. Apart from the teenagers, there
is very little evidence of increasing inequality in employment outcomes.
The patterns of employment and non-employment rates in the Swedish labor market are
not easily interpreted in terms of the popular hypothesis about global pervasive trends in
labor demand that are particularly harmful for less skilled workers. The empirical work
reported in Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1995) documented some trend increase in
non-employment among the less skilled, and some increase in mismatch. These trends
are exclusively driven by deteriorating labor market performance among 16-19 year-
olds. Employment rates among prime-aged men in the bottom  decile of the wage
distribution have been roughly constant during the period 1971-91. This stability is in
marked contrast to the sharp fall in employment rates among the least skilled men in the
US labor market (see Juhn, Murphy and Topel, 1991).
One might speculate that the growth of the Swedish public sector has counteracted negative
relative demand shifts for low skilled workers, thereby being particularly helpful for the less
skilled in the labor market. The share of public employment in the labor force increased from
20 percent in the early 1960s to almost 40 percent in the mid-1980s. Public-sector employment
increased by 4-5 percent per year during the 1970s, with almost all of the expansion taking
place in the local government sector. Is there any evidence that low-skilled workers who have
been priced out of the private sector have been employed by the rapidly expanding public
sector? The fact is, however, that the public sector does not employ many low-educated men
(see Edin and Holmlund, 1994, for further discussion). The number of men in the public sector
with only basic (compulsory) education has been around 40 000 - 50 000 during the past 20
years, to be compared with over one million low-educated men in the private sector during the9
1970s (and over 600 000 in the early 1990s). It does not seem very plausible that the
expanding public sector has been an important alternative employer for low-skilled men that
have lost their jobs in the private sector.3
3.2 Labor market outcomes and socioeconomic background in the 1980s and the 1990s
We will in this section portray labor market outcomes among Swedish youths at age 22 by
means of data sets from 1986 and 1995. During those two years, Statistics Sweden made
surveys among those who left the compulsory nine-year school seven years earlier, i.e., in 1979
and 1988. The respondents were asked in detail about their present labor market situation, and
to some degree about their labor market history in the past few years. The data for 1995
include information on parents socioeconomic background as well as immigrant status; the data
for 1986 do not have this information.4
                                                        
3The role of the public sector is much larger for women. Between 1971 and 1984, female employment
grew by 39 percent. Expansion of the public sector accounted for 96 percent of these jobs (Edin and
Topel, 1997).
4 For further information on the data, see SCB (1987) and (1996).10
Table 2 Labor Market Status by Family Background and Education, February 1995. Linear probability models.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Employment Unemployment Programs Education Non-partic.
(excl. education)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant .447 .309 .108 .044 .044 .041 .368 .603 .034 .004
(34.2) (20.3) (12.67) (4.42) (9.22) (7.18) (32.20) (47.42) (4.64) (0.44)
Female -.048 -.036 -.046 -0.043 -.017 -.017 .037 .020 .074 .076
(4.72) (3.59) (6.91) (6.60) (4.73) (4.54) (4.13) (2.41) (13.23) (13.52)
Foreign citizen -.108 -.062 .026 .040 .005 .006 .072 .004 .005 .011
(10.12) (5.76) (3.73) (5.67) (1.20) (1.57) (7.73) (0.50) (0.92) (1.83)
Family background
SEI-1 .167 .111 .039 .014 -.003 -.005 -.244 -.148 .041 .028
(10.78) (7.13) (3.86) (1.38) (0.60) (0.85) (18.02) (11.39) (4.78) (3.16)
SEI-2 .172 .112 .044 .025 -.003 -.006 -.229 -.139 .017 .008
(10.45) (6.82) (4.06) (2.30) (0.56) (0.91) (15.94) (10.13) (1.84) (0.81)
SEI-3 .151 .118 .009 .000 -.004 -.005 -.156 -.108 -.001 -.005
(7.95) (6.29) (0.73) (0.01) (0.60) (0.79) (9.36) (6.89) (0.07) (0.47)
SEI-4 .069 .054 .011 .013 -.007 -.009 -.066 -.054 -.006 -.004
(4.09) (3.25) (0.98) (1.19) (1.21) (1.39) (4.52) (3.93) (0.62) (0.43)
SEI-5 0 0 0 0000000
(omitted)
SEI-6 -.074 -.008 -.013 .014 .037 -.035 .115 .004 .009 .025
(-0.75) (0.08) (0.20) (0.22) (1.02) (0.96) (1.33) (0.05) (0.17) (0.45)
SEI-7 .186 .149 .011 .001 -.007 -.009 -.180 -.126 -.010 -.015
(8.12) (6.59) (0.72) (0.09) (0.89) (1.08) (8.96) (6.70) (0.79) (1.17)
SEI-8 .214 .157 -.007 -.020 -.012 -.015 -.204 -.124 .009 .002
(5.85) (4.38) (0.28) (-0.86) (0.93) (1.11) (6.40) (4.14) (0.45) (0.10)11
Table 2, cont.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Employment Unemployment Programs Education Non-partic.
(excl. education)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
High school education
No .122 .124 -.002 -.317 .072
(7.50) (11.58) (0.32) (23.29) (7.88)
1 yr .204 .113 .002 -.367 .048
(8.21) (6.95) (0.23) (17.73) (3.42)
2 yr vocational .238 .088 .008 -.376 .042
(18.17) (10.20) (1.55) (34.38) (5.72)
3 yr vocational .975 .052 .013 -.362 .022
(12.48) (3.59) (1.62) (19.70) (1.77)
2 yr theoretical .124 .073 .000 -.211 .014
(5.99) (5.40) (0.03) (12.26) (1.21)
3 yr theoretical 0 0 0 0 0
(omitted)
R
2 0.031 0.068 0.010 0.028 0.003 0.003 0.051 0.166 0.024 0.031
# observations 9515 9515 9515 9515 9515 9515 9515 9515 9515 9515
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The family background socioeconomic indicators (SEI) are as follows: (1)  unskilled blue-collar worker;
(2) skilled blue-collar worker; (3) white-collar worker, lower level; (4) white-collar worker, intermediate level; (5)  white-collar
worker, upper level; (6) self-employed professional; (7)  owner of business; (8) farmer.12
We begin by looking at labor market status in 1995, which allow us to examine the role of
parental background and immigrant status. We estimate linear probability models for ease of
interpretation and focus on five states in February 1995: (regular) employment, unemployment,
labor market programs, education, and non-participation. The results are reported in Table 2.
The first column for each case only includes parental characteristics in addition to gender and
immigrant status; the second includes in addition the high school choice of the respondent. 5
The results suggest that parental background does matter for labor market outcomes. These
results become somewhat weaker, but are still strongly significant, when education is
accounted for. This suggests that parental effects work partly through educational choice. The
effects of parental background are very strong for employment and education, much weaker
for unemployment and non-participation, and of no importance for program participation.
What do these estimates say about the situation for disadvantaged youths? The results here are
not quite clear cut. First, if we define disadvantaged youth by parents’ skill, we find that youths
with blue-collar parents (SEI 1 and 2) are not worse of in all dimensions. They have lower
school enrollment rates and possibly somewhat higher unemployment, at least when we do not
control for education, but they have higher employment rates. A similar pattern is true also for
youths with farmer parents (SEI 8). Their lower school enrollment is offset by higher
employment rates.
                                                        
5We choose to use high school curriculum instead of highest level of schooling as our education variable, since a majority of those
choosing to continue to college have not graduated by the date of the survey. Most of those who attend college have a three year
theoretical high school degree.13
Second, as could be expected, the situation of youths with immigrant background seems quite
problematic.6 Lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates are only partly offset
by higher school enrollment. Furthermore, the higher school enrollment rate disappears when
we control for high school choice. Even if youths with an immigrant background do worse
than ”native” youths, their situation seems reasonably good compared with recent immigrants
(see Wadensjö, 1996). One should bear in mind that the group of ”immigrants” we have in our
sample have completed the Swedish compulsory school and spent several years in the country.
Finally, we note that youths who decided not to go on to high school experience a tough
situation in the labor market. Their high unemployment rates and low school enrollment rates
are not by far compensated by higher employment rates. This group also has a substantially
higher rate of non-participation. Also, it seems that youths that choose vocational high schools
or short theoretical high schools are worse off than those who choose long theoretical high
schools, even if these differences are smaller than those between no high school and long
theoretical high schools.
We have also untertaken a direct comparison of labor market outcomes in 1986 and 1995. In
addition to gender, we include dummies for early education (whether the individuals continued
to high school and the type of high school education). The education variable is the only
measure of skill that is available in both samples. The estimates of linear
                                                        
6Immigrant background is defined as having both parents born abroad.14
Table 3 Labor Market Status by Education, February 1986 and February 1995. Linear probability models.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Employment Unemployment Education Non-participation
(excl. education)
1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Constant .564 .343 .025 .057 .402 .566 .009 .005
(49.59) (22.68) (4.26) (5.85) (42.36) (45.84) (1.63) (0.58)
Female -.033 -.051 .001 -.039 .005 .023 .027 .076
(3.75) (4.13) (0.30) (4.87) (0.69) (2.25) (6.58) (11.24)
High school education
No .186 .176 .061 .123 -.296 -.398 .049 .093
(13.35) (8.31) (8.36) (9.11) (25.53) (23.05) (7.73) (7.93)
1 yr .236 .277 .052 .096 -.320 -.434 .032 .054
(12.20) (9.09) (5.19) (4.93) (19.87) (17.48) (3.56) (3.21)
2 yr vocational .253 .302 .026 .083 -.293 -.440 .015 .045
(20.42) (17.94) (4.03) (7.72) (28.45) (32.13) (2.55) (4.82)
3 yr vocational - .350 - .058 - -.440 - .018
(13.97) (3.60) (21.53) (1.29)
2 yr theoretical .178 .169 .025 .074 -.203 -.268 .011 .020
(11.17) (6.80) (4.26) (4.66) (15.32) (13.22) (1.52) (1.46)
3 yr theoretical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(omitted)
R
2 0.045 0.062 0.009 0.019 0.091 0.159 0.011 0.031
# observations 9770 6188 9770 6188 9770 6188 9770 6188
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: t-values in parentheses.15
probability models for employment, unemployment, education and non-participation in one week in
February 1986 and one week in February 1995 are shown in Table 3. 7
Once again the results suggest that early schooling decisions are strongly associated with labor market
outcomes for youths. Youths with no or short high school education have higher unemployment rates,
lower schooling rates and higher rates of non-participation. However, they also have higher employment
rates. The labor market situation for youths has of course deteriorated substantially between 1986 and
1995. It is still true that low skilled youths have higher unemployment and non-participation rates as well
as lower rates of school enrollment. It is unclear, though, to what extent the1990s crisis has hit the low
skilled youths more than other youths. Low skilled youths have reduced their school enrollment and
increased their rates of non-participation, but the development of employment and unemployment rates
may be interpreted somewhat differently. Youths with no high school have about 18 percentage points
higher employment rates than youths with long theoretical high school in both 1986 and 1995. The entire
fall in youth employment between these years is attributed to a shift in the intercept. Thus, high skilled
youths experienced a larger relative drop in employment rates, since they had a lower employment rate
initially.
Low skilled youths have experienced a larger absolute increase in unemployment rates than high skilled
youth. The unemployment differential between no high school and long theoretical high school increased
from 6 to 12 percentage points between 1986 and 1995. However, this increase is less striking in relative
terms. The unemployment rate for youths with long theoretical high school was also more than doubled
                                                        
7Employment programs organized by the labour market agency are included in regular employment. These were
not reported separately in 1986, when they accounted for about one percent of the sample, SCB (1996).16
during this period (from 2.5 to 5.7 percent). Thus, the pattern of stable unemployment relativities
observed across educational groups in aggregate data also appear within this group of youth.
The estimates reported above refer to a snapshot of the labor market situation of two cohorts at age 22 at
different points in time with very different overall labor market conditions. To get some idea of the
dynamics of labor market entry, we summarize the labor force status of each cohort by six month periods
for two and a half year prior to the interview in Table 4. The respondents were asked to report their main
activity by six month period. Here we report these data for the full samples. The same exercise for the
low skilled (no high school) youths tells a similar story.
Apart from noting the large differences in levels across years, there is a striking difference in the
development over time across cohorts. In the 1980s there is a strong and steady increase employment
rates over time - from 59 percent in the fall of 1983 to 71 percent in the fall of 1985. There is no such
trend in the 1990’s. The employment rate actually falls early on to recover during the last year and a half.
The long run consequences of  these problems of entering the labor market for the 1990 cohort will
probably depend crucially on what alternative routes of entering the labor market they have access to.
The table illustrates that the lower employment rates (26 percentage points) are ”compensated” mainly by
higher participation in public employment programs (8 points), higher unemployment rates (6 points), and
higher school enrollment rates (7 points).
Table 4  Labor Market Status by Six-Month Period: 1980s vs. 1990s (percent)
A. 1986 Sample17
Fall 1983 Spring 1984 Fall 1984 Spring 1985 Fall 1985
Employment 59.3 62.2 66.8 69.7 71.3
Programs 4.5 3.4 2.0 1.7 1.2
Unemployment 4.6 3.2 3.6 2.8 3.6
Education 15.6 16.3 17.4 17.4 18.2
Non-participation
(excl. Education)
14.9 14.1 8.5 7.7 5.4
B. 1995 Sample
Fall 1992 Spring 1993 Fall 1993 Spring 1994 Fall 1994
Employment 40.6 38.4 39.5 41.4 44.9
Programs 12.8 14.8 12.8 14.0 9.7
Unemployment 7.8 8.8 10.8 8.2 9.3
Education 22.3 22.1 22.9 23.3 24.8
Non-participation
(excl. Education)
13.3 13.0 11.0 10.4 7.7
The notion that unemployment can have serious long run consequences for youth is probably not
controversial. The question is then whether participation in public employment programs or regular
education can counteract these negative effects. We will return to a discussion of labor market programs
in section 4. Concerning the effects of increased school enrollment rates, we have no direct evidence.
Judging from the type of education these youths enroll in - all of the increase is in regular
college/university education - it is plausible that increasing education has a counteracting effect.
3.3 Evidence on wage behavior
To what extent has the slump been associated with widening wage differentials among age and education
categories? We have used data from two surveys, augmented with information on wages based on the18
respondents’ own reports, to estimate standard wage equations with age and education dummies. The
surveys are the Household Market and Nonmarket Activities (HUS)8 and the Labor Force Survey
(AKU); the latter is undertaken by Statistics Sweden and has included questions on wages for later years.
The wage data in AKU seem to be plagued with substantial measurement errors. The standard deviation
of log hourly wages in the 1991 sample is about twice the size of those
Table 5 Youth relative wages
_____________________________________________________________________








1984 0.66 - - 0.80 -
1986 0.80 - - 0.80 -
1988 0.76 - - 0.83 -
1991 0.74 0.67 0.72 0.81 0.82
1992 - 0.68 0.69 - 0.82
1993 - 0.76 0.79 - 0.82
1994 - 0.75 0.74 - 0.81
Note: All entries are based on regressions with education and gender controls. The HUS
estimates are reproduced from Edin and Holmlund (1995).
reported by Edin and Holmlund (1995) from the HUS data for the same year. A comparison of the 90th
and the 10th wage decile, however, shows an almost identical differential. In the empirical analysis below
we report only estimates from samples where we have excluded the top and the bottom percentile. There
                                                        
8 For a description, see Klevmarken and Olofsson (1993).19
is also some evidence that self reported schooling levels in the labor force surveys tend to overstate actual
schooling. On the whole, however, we believe that the AKU data should say something about changes
over time in the wage structure, even if one should be careful in interpreting the magnitude of various
wage differentials using these data.
The estimated relative wages of youths are set out in Table 5. Since the earlier HUS teenage estimates are
based on 18-19 year olds, we report AKU estimates for both 16-19 and 18-19 year olds. The teenage
relative wages tend to vary across years, but there is no clear change between 1991 and 1994. The
relative wages of young adults (20-24 years) are stable around 80 percent. The overall impression is that
the results do not indicate any relative wage adjustments for potentially disadvantaged youths during the
major slump in the early 1990s.
￿￿￿/DERU￿0DUNHW￿3URJUDPV￿DQG￿<RXWK￿(PSOR\PHQW￿￿&URZGLQJ￿,Q￿RU￿&URZGLQJ￿2XW"
In the previous section, we saw that much of the rise in non-employment among youth is
accounted for by an increase in participation in active labor market policy programs ( ALMPs).
This raises a question about the effects of ALMPs on regular employment. This is the main theme
of the present section. We begin by giving a very brief background on Swedish  ALMPs in general
and programs targeted at youths in particular, as well as some figures describing the volume of the
programs. We then present some new evidence on the effects of ALMPs targeted at youths on
regular youth employment.20
Over the years since the 1950s, when the foundations of modern Swedish  ALMPs were laid down,
a large number of different measures have been used. The programs are financed by the central
government and implemented by the central Labor Market Board and its regional bodies. Apart
from the public employment service, Swedish  ALMPs can be broadly classified into employment
creation, training and mobility enhancing measures 9. The two principal programs that have been
employed over the whole period since the 1950s are temporary public sector jobs, called relief
work, and labor market training. During the first half of the 1980s, they were supplemented by a
number of new programs, one of which was explicitly targeted at youth. In the wake of the rapidly
growing unemployment in the early 1990s, participation in many programs (the most notable
exception being relief work10) has grown considerably and a number of new measures have been
introduced.
Before 1984, the dominant measure for youths in terms of participation was relief work (see Table
6)￿￿Since their introduction in 1984 in the form of ”youth teams”, which provided teenagers with
half-time employment and encouraging job seeking, special youth measures have taken a number
of forms. After a few years, youth teams were succeeded by ”job introduction” schemes, providing
work experience for teenagers. As is evident from Table 6, these programs had a rather modest
volume. In 1992, a form called youth practice was introduced at the same time as the volume was
increased rapidly.
                                                        
9 Since the volumes of mobility enhancing measures have been very modest since the 1960s and since displacement
hardly is an issue related to these programs, we will not discuss them here
10 This is a notable exception, as relief work traditionally has been the prime measure to deal with cyclical swings
in the labor market.21















1978 28584 18000 46584
1979 29431 19631 49062
1980 12581 15689 28270
1981 12527 11071 23598
1982 30418 12298 42716
1983 38260 12914 51174
1984 19310 13123 17743 50176
1985 7891 11977 30542 50410
1986 6423 12030 24473 42926
1987 5019 12465 17869 35353
1988 3668 14988 10096 28752
1989 2189 11842 4487 18518
1990 1598 10236 2959 14793
1991 2265 17439 762 9617 30083
1992 2369 25862 3805 29738 61774
1993 238 11580 3296 4751 58330 78195
Source: Skedinger (1995).
Youth practice was targeted at youths below age 25. The objective was to provide the participants
with practice and professional experience. The introduction of this measure was accompanied by
instructions aiming at minimizing displacement (participants should not replace ordinary  recruitees;
the measure was to be seen as a ”measure of last resort”). The employer received free labor,
whereas the participant received a grant. The normal duration was six months. A final thing to22
notice about the program is that it, in contrast to previous measures, primarily is directed to the
private sector.
The number of studies dealing with displacement effects of Swedish  ALMPs is small, and the
number of those explicitly dealing with youth measures even smaller. The main thrust of these
studies is that the displacement effect of job creation programs is significant, estimates ranging
between 40 per cent and more than 100 per cent.11 The results of the two studies explicitly
treating youth measures are no exceptions.
Skedinger (1995) uses quarterly data for the period 1970:3 to 1991:4 to estimate a VAR including
youth (18-24 years old) participation in labor market programs and youth employment. The
derived impulse-response function implies more than 100 per cent crowding out during the first
quarter and significant crowding out for two quarters. Skedinger’s results have been questioned
by, i.a., Holmlund (1995), who shows that a reasonable reformulation of the VAR gives an
estimated displacement of around 40 per cent, rather than above 100 per cent. Still, this is
significant crowding out. Forslund (1996) analyzes a panel of the Swedish municipalities for the
period 1990-94. His estimates indicate that youth programs crowd out 95 per cent of total
employment in the short run and about 75 per cent in the long run.
To throw more light on the effects of youth measures on regular youth employment, we use the
data set constructed by Forslund (1996) to estimate a model of the demand for youth labor. The
                                                        
11 The studies include Gramlich and Ysander (1981), Forslund and Krueger (1997),  Calmfors and Skedinger
(1995), Ohlsson (1995) and Forslund (1996).23
dependent variable is the employment to population share of youths aged 18 -24. In addition to
time dummies, the right-hand side variables include the lagged dependent variable to take care of
sluggish adjustment, the adult employment rate to control for ”aggregate” employment shocks, an
index for municipality-specific labor demand for youth,  GHPDQG￿ the (average annual) labor
income of youth as a proxy for the youth wage rate. We also include the participation rate in youth
measures, which is the fraction of the population, age 18-24, that is enrolled in a youth program.
Finally, we include the youth share of the population in the age interval 18-65 to control for
relative supply effects to the extent that these are imprecisely captured by the youth income
variable. All variables are available for all Swedish municipalities for the years 1990-94.
Most variables are straightforward, but the demand variable warrants some explanation. Time
dummies are used in the estimations to control for aggregate demand shifts, but to purge the
estimates of spurious correlation between municipality employment and youth programs, we want
to control for municipality-specific shifts in the demand for youths. The variable is constructed in
the following way: the industry distribution of youth employment by municipality in 1990 is used
to generate municipality-specific weights. The demand index is constructed by applying these
weights to the aggregate employment development in each of about 60 industries and dividing by
the number of youths in each of the years.
The model is estimated in fixed-effect form. The presence of the lagged dependent variable as well
as measurement errors and simultaneity problems caution against OLS estimation. Thus, in
addition to estimating the model by OLS on within-groups transformed data, we have used the IV24
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1992) implemented in the OX program DPD ( Arellano, Bond
and Doornik, 1997).
The major simultaneity problem in this study, as well as in other studies of displacement, is related
to the reasonable hypothesis that programs are adjusted in response to the labor market situation.
A negative correlation between youth employment and youth program participation, thus, may as
well reflect this policy reaction as crowding out.  Instrumenting is one way to deal with this
problem. Another way that we have used is related to the dating of the variables. Employment is
measured in November each year, whereas program participation is measured as a twelve-month
average preceding November.
Another reason to introduce instruments is the presence of the adult employment rate in the
equation. To the extent that both youth and adult employment are driven by common shocks, this
will introduce bias into OLS estimates. The choice of instruments for the adult employment rate is
based on the estimates in Forslund (1996).12 The main instrument for the youth program variable
in addition to its own lag is the lagged unemployment rate, as it is known that the allocation of
resources to labor market programs is based on the past unemployment history of a region.
The sample means of the data are presented in Table 7 ￿and the preferred estimated models are
presented in Table 8￿ Looking at the data in Table 7, some tendencies are worth noting. First, the
fall in youth employment is dramatic: the youth employment rate falls from just below 75 per cent
in 1990 to around 45 per cent in 1993 and 1994. This fall is much more pronounced than the25
corresponding fall in the adult employment rate. Second, the fraction of youths in youth programs
rises drastically from below half a per cent in 1990 to above eight per cent in 1993 and 1994.
Table 7 Sample means of the variables in the estimated model 1990-1994
Variable 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
youth income 89200 93400 97700 99100 97000
youth employment rate .749 .670 .537 .434 .462
adult employment rate 
a .649 .626 .598 .558 .562
demand 5.49 5.34 5.09 4.78 4.96
youth share of population 
b .155 .151 .148 .145 .142
youth programs .004 .013 .032 .082 .083
a Number of employed over age 24 relative to population over age 24.
b Population aged 18-24 relative to population aged 18-65.
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 See the note to Table 8￿ for a list of all instruments used in the GMM estimations.26


















lagged dep. variable 0.482 0.001 -0.032
(14.75) (0.01) (-0.30)
demand index 0.218 0.197
(2.18) (0.59)
adult employment rate 1.658 2.44 2.59 2.24
(13.66) (7.86) (6.25) (6.50)
youth income -0.103 -0.186
(-1.573) (-0.90)
youth programs -0.006 -0.057 -0.056 -0.079
(-1.71) (-5.05) (-5.44) (-4.76)
youth population share -0.156 -0.453 -0.537 -0.562
(-1.82) (-1.96) (-3.07) (-2.88)
$ s  (levels) 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.049
Note: The number of municipalities is 284. The estimation period is 1991-94 for models 1 and 4;
1992-94 for models 2 and 3. Time dummies are used in all models to control for aggregate
variables. The numbers in the brackets are t-statistics. All variables are in natural logarithms. The
instruments used are the lags of: the dependent variable; the demand index; the youth employment
share; the unemployment rate (by municipality); the population share of elderly (above 65); the
population share of kids (below 18); average incomes; youth incomes; employment creating labor
market programs (excluding youth programs); retraining programs; demand index for total
employment. The OLS standard errors are two-step, heteroscedasticity consistent estimates. All
GMM models pass the usual tests: absence of second-order serial correlation and a  Sargan test for
instrument validity. The reported t-values in the GMM estimations are based on the second-step
standard errors, which are known from Monte Carlo studies to be biased downwards for a number
of DGPs, see Bergström (1997).27
The estimated models13 pass specification tests at conventional levels 14 and the signs of the point
estimates are the expected ones (with the exception of the negative coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable in 0RGHO￿￿). Thus, we find an insignificant negative effect of youth income
(which proxies the youth wage rate), an insignificant positive effect of municipality demand, a
negative effect of the youth population share, and, most importantly for our present purposes, a
significant negative effect of youth programs on relative youth employment. It is also instructive to
note that the estimates of the elasticity of the youth employment rate with respect to the adult
employment rate fall between a bit below 2 (the OLS estimate) and just above 2.5, thus confirming
that youth employment is indeed more volatile than the employment of adults.
Leaving the OLS estimates aside, the reported short-run elasticities of youth employment with
respect to youth programs fall between -.056 and -.079 and seem rather robust to at least small
changes in model specification (compare models 2, 3 and 4). Noting that the point estimate effect
of the lagged variable is very close to zero, implying rapid adjustment, the long-run effects
virtually coincide with their short-run counterparts.15 A change in program participation from,
say, 3 per cent to 9 per cent16 would then be expected to drive down youth employment by
between 6.2 and 8.7 per cent (taking the two extreme estimates of the elasticity), or between 3.5
                                                        
13 With the exception of the OLS within-groups model, where, in addition to all possible simultaneity and other
reasons to believe in biased estimates, the residuals are strongly serially correlated.
14 The Sargan test concerns instrument validity and basically tests for correlations between instruments and
estimated residuals. The estimator relies on absence of first-order serial correlation in the residuals of the model in
levels form, which translates into absence of second-order serial correlation in the estimated residuals, as the model
is estimated on first-difference form.
15 The estimate of long-run crowding out derived from model 2, evaluated at sample means, is 76 percent.
16 These figures would be in the neighborhood of the actual figures in Table 8, although they actually understate the
change between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s.28
and 4.9 percentage points. Thus, the estimates provide evidence for the hypothesis that youth
measures may actually have provided a significant contribution to the fall in youth employment
between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s.
Looking at the development in the sample, the fall in the youth employment rate between 1990
and 1994 is 28.7 percentage points. The estimates, taken at face value, ascribe between 12.5 and
17.7 of these percentage points, or around half of the fall, to the expansion of youth programs.
￿￿￿&RQFOXGLQJ￿5HPDUNV
We have taken a look at the labor market experience of Swedish youths during the depression of the
1990s and made some comparisons with youth employment and unemployment during earlier decades.
During the 1970s and the 1980s there is not much evidence of deteriorating labor market performance
among Swedish youths, despite sharply increasing youth relative wages (particularly for teenagers). There
is no obvious explanation for the lack of "action" in employment despite the marked pay compression.
We have considered the role of the public sector as an employer of last resort for disadvantaged youths.
The support for this hypothesis is not overwhelming, however.
The slump in the 1990s has been associated with dramatic increases in youth unemployment and youth
participation in active labor market programs. The impact on unemployment rates by age and education
has been roughly proportional, however; unemployment rates among the young and the less skilled have
increased most in absolute terms, but the relative increases have been similar across age and education
groups. The evolution of employment and unemployment does not offer much ground for the popular
hypothesis that the recent rise in unemployment is driven by large and pervasive shifts in the demand for29
labor by skill attributable to technological innovation. Wage differentials have been roughly stable during
the slump, which also cautions against interpretations in terms of adverse labor demand shifts against the
young and the less skilled.
The employment crisis has been met by an unprecedented increase in active labor market programs, in
large part targeted at unemployed youths. There is a risk that these programs may crowd out regular
youth employment, a hypothesis that is supported in our empirical investigation of regular youth
employment in Swedish municipalities. There are of course potential long run benefits from participation
in active labor market programs relative to open unemployment, although these have been difficult to
confirm in the existing evaluation studies ( Forslund and Krueger 1995). There is however an obvious risk
that the exceptional volumes of programs in the 1990s have put them into the region with decreasing
marginal returns. A strategy for viable employment growth must have other ingredients than more of the
same active labor market programs.30
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Figure A1 Non-Participation rates for males with no high school, short high school or long high 
























































































































































































Figure A2 Unemployment-to-population rates for males with no high school, short high school or 
long high school, Labor Force Surveys
A. 16-19 years
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